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Now that Congress will decide on intervention in Syria, its
leaders have moved to support Obama’s plans for military
action.
Earlier this week, President Obama announced that he would ask for a Congressional vote on any potential
military intervention in Syria. Ryan C. Hendrickson writes that Congress did not force Obama to seek
legislative approval, and that even before the announcement many of Congress’s key leaders had already
fallen in line with the President’s desire for a military strike. Now, we are witnessing strong pressure from the
congressional leadership with those on both sides of the political divide lobbying the House and Senate to
support their commander in chief.
Last Saturday, President Barack Obama shocked many in the United States, and apparently most of  his
senior f oreign policy advisors, by deciding to turn to Congress to request their support f or a military strike
on Syria. While American commanders in chief  have previously requested congressional backing prior to
military action abroad, much as President George W. Bush did af ter the terrorist strikes on September 11,
2001, and prior to America’s invasion of  Iraq in 2003, since World War II American presidents have of ten
asserted unilateral powers as commander in chief , and Congress has generally f ollowed along with the
President’s military desires.
To be sure, Congress was given considerable war powers to check the president, including most
importantly, the Constitutional power to declare war. America’s f ounding f athers were quite clear, in that
they desired that no single man (e.g. the president) would be permitted to enter into wars abroad unless he
was responding to “repel sudden attacks” against the United States.  Otherwise, it was the peoples’ branch
who would determine if  America would enter war.
Yet with the Cold War’s onset,
America’s presidents became
increasingly imperial, waging
wars, bombing abroad, using f orce, and invading f oreign states, with litt le “check” f rom Congress.
 Presidents asserted that as the United States commander in chief –with communist f orces challenging
American security—that they were empowered to determine when, if  and how the United States will use
military f orce. Since many of  America’s military actions have been domestically popular, at least at the
onset, Congress largely abdicated these war powers to the president. Over t ime, many members of
Congress became complacent and content to let the president make all crit ical military decisions f or the
United States.  Whether it was President Clinton’s military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, or President
George H.W. Bush’s invasion of  Panama in 1989, or Ronald Reagan’s war in Grenada in 1983, Presidents
have assumed unilateral military authority, which Congress has ceded to the executive branch, all of  which
makes it so interesting that Obama explicit ly turned to Congress to seek their support on Syria.
What is taking place now in the United States Congress, however, echoes past practices of  Congressional
def erence to the commander in chief , which is especially evident in the behavior of  many of  Congress’s
leaders. Even bef ore Obama turned to Congress to request its support, House Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi rushed to Obama’s side, indicating her backing f or military strikes absent a vote f rom Congress.
Senator John McCain, the ranking minority member of  the Senate Armed Services Committee, along with his
long-time backer Senator Lindsey Graham, were similarly ready to start the bombings without Congress’s
approval. House Foreign Af f airs Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon was also ready to strike prior
to Obama’s Saturday surprise. Speaker of  the House John Boehner was calling f or more consultation with
Congress, but also was taking no action to bring members of  the House back f rom their summer recess.
Much as he did during the congressional debates over Libya, Boehner was working to avoid any explicit
actions by Congress that would in any way f orce the House to take some constitutional and polit ical
responsibility f or the potential strikes to come. Thus, it is not at all evident that Congress “f orced” Obama
to seek f or their legislative approval; many of  Congress’s key leaders had already f allen in line with the
commander in chief .
It is also instructive to examine those members of  Congress who were most “assertive” vis-à-vis the
president prior to his Saturday surprise. Congressman Scott Rigell circulated a letter among his colleagues
to request that Obama gain Congressional approval bef ore taking military action, which squares with the
general principle of  checks and balances. Rigell should be commended f or his ef f orts to at least request a
vote, though his ef f orts only generated a whopping 33 signatures, or 7.5 percent of  all members of  the
House of  Representatives! Most members of  Congress wanted nothing to do with that letter.
Now that the question has been placed with the House and Senate, f orcing Congress to explicit ly take a
stand, we are witnessing strong pressure f rom the congressional leadership to support the commander in
chief . Bef ore the House proceedings even began, Speaker Boehner signed on with Obama. House
Republican Majority Leader Eric Cantor also has expressed his approval f or a military response, so
Boehner and Cantor will work to secure Republican votes, and Pelosi and House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer
(who also agrees with Obama also) will work the House Democratic rank and f ile to back the president. By
some accounts, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, who also supports Obama, is also rushing to ensure a
Senate vote on this issue as soon as possible.
These debates will be contentious, and many members in the House and Senate will vote against President
Obama’s plans, but the practice of  def erring to and empowering the commander in chief  by Congress’s
leaders appears well entrenched.
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